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FY 2018 BSIP Initiatives			
	FY 2018 Request	FY 2018 Enacted	FY 2019 Request
Tactical Infrastructure			
30. Border Wall and Fencing			
a. New Wall System	\$1,282.2M	\$641.0M	\$1,600.0M
b. Replacement Primary Wall	\$0	\$445.0M	
c. Replace Secondary Wall	\$251.0M	\$251.0M	
d. Wall Planning	\$38.0M	\$38.0M	
31. AMO Tethered Aerostat Radar System Enhancements	\$0	\$3.2M	\$0.0M
At the POEs			
Personnel			
32. NTC Staff Expansion	\$10.0M	\$10.0M	\$16.7M
Facilities, Equipment and Technology			
33. NTC Intelligence and Targeting System Upgrades	\$54.9M	\$52.4M	\$65.1M
34. Land POE Projects			
a. CBP PC&I Budget	PC&I: \$14.8M	PC&I: \$14.8M	PC&I: \$14.8M
b. U.S. General Services Administration Federal Buildings Fund	\$507.0M	\$254.8M	\$275.9M
35. Biometric Entry-Exit	\$71.0M	Fee Funded	Fee Funded
36. Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS)	\$27.0M	\$27.0M	\$27.0M
37. Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS)	\$27.7M	\$27.7M	\$27.7M
38. Immigration Advisory Program (IAP)	\$9.2M	\$9.2M	\$14.2M
39. Preclearance	\$70.3M	\$70.3M	\$70.8M
40. CBP Mobile Technology	\$12.0M	\$12.0M	\$12.0M
41. OFO Non-Intrusive Inspection Acquisitions	\$109.2M	\$224.6M	\$44.2M
42. Border Security Deployment Program (BSDP)	\$11.1M	\$11.1M	\$11.1M
43. Opioid Testing and Safety Expansion	\$0	\$30.5M	\$0
44. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)	\$40.0M	\$40.0M	\$40.5M

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FY 2018 BSIP Initiatives			
	FY 2018 Request	FY 2018 Enacted	FY 2019 Request
45. Container Security Initiative	\$62.8M	\$50.8M	\$71.6M
46. OFO Agricultural Risk Detection	\$0	\$0	\$0
47. OFO Primary/Secondary IT Refresh	\$0	\$0	\$0
Enterprise-wide			
48. Office of International Affairs – International Diplomacy Mission	\$39.7M	\$35.1M	\$44.2M
49. Enhance Law Enforcement Safety & Compliance (LESC) Staffing & Procurement	\$45.5M	\$0	\$40.5M
50. Office of Intelligence Staffing Increases	\$34.0M	\$37.3M	\$47.8M
51. Intelligence Capability Increases	\$16.9M	\$16.5M	\$16.8M
52. Laboratory and Forensic Support Expansion	\$0	\$0	\$0

Detailed descriptions of newly developed investment initiatives are provided below and on the following pages. These descriptions are not provided in a priority order. The numbering associated with each priority initiative is intended only for ease of reference. Each initiative is accompanied by a brief description, an explanation of the outcomes that it is intended to influence, an overview of the costs, milestones for implementation, a description of any methods used to identify the solution, and any methods used to evaluate effectiveness.

2018 BSIP Initiative # 1: National Vetting Center

OVERVIEW: National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, *Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting Enterprise*, signed on February 6, 2018, established the NVC to be led by DHS. The Secretary subsequently delegated this authority to CBP. National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 requires a 180-day implementation plan, which was completed and submitted to the Administration on August 15, 2018 and subsequently approved by the President. NVC resourcing requirements constituted a significant portion of the FYs 2020-2024 Winter Study, titled “Enhancing Screening & Vetting through Information Sharing.”

AFFECTED CAPABILITIES:

- Screening
- Scanning

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- Targeting and vetting
- Intelligence
- Analysis

RELATED OUTCOMES:

BSIP Goal 1, Objective 3: Strengthen CBP's counter-network approach across all aspects of CBP's mission set to attack and disrupt criminal and terrorist networks

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

- (b) (7)(E)
- DHS will need to support the continuing development of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System-based results hub and case management viewer.
- NVC will require oversight and other support personnel.
- (b) (7)(E)
- DHS components such as CBP, USCIS, and ICE may need to support (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)

2018 BSIP Initiative # 2: Intelligent Trade Enforcement, Analytics, and Systems

OVERVIEW: Intelligent Trade Enforcement is a key part of *Trade Strategy 2020*, which is a comprehensive approach to addressing several mandates and capability gaps for CBP trade operations identified by the Department and the Administration as detailed in Executive Order 13785: *Establishing Enhanced Collection and Enforcement of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and Violations of Trade and Customs Laws*.

Intelligent Trade Enforcement aims to protect U.S. economic viability by subverting trade networks that finance illicit activity. This approach will enhance targeting (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) Intelligent enforcement also will enable CBP to:

- Increase controls over revenue in critical areas and reduced revenue loss, and improve analytics for comprehensive risk management;
- Expand CBP's common intelligence picture focused on illicit trade threats and supply chain dynamics via information and intelligence product development by the Trade Intelligence Division and CBP's Intelligence Enterprise partners;
- Develop new functions for financial, account, network, and pattern-based targeting;

- Integrate activities at tactical (port), operational (Centers of Excellence and Expertise, National Threat Analysis Centers), and strategic (Headquarter) levels through federated view;
- Develop more efficient regulations, policies, and systems to manage volumes and shifts in patterns, and to improve facilitation; and empower employees with skills, strategies, and the means to manage next-generation trade environment.

AFFECTED CAPABILITIES:

- Risk assessments
- Analysis
- Screening
- Scanning
- Information sharing and dissemination

RELATED OUTCOMES:

BSIP Goal 2, Objective 2: Enhance impedance and denial of illegal border crossings

BSIP Goal 3, Objective 2: Increase ability to address border security risks as early as possible

Intelligent enforcement will result in:

- Accomplishing the Executive Order 13785 on antidumping and countervailing duties, which would enhance bonding recommendations;
- Developing an analytics capability that complements Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) cargo processing and Automated Targeting System targeting;
- Building **(b) (7)(E)** targeting capability in the Automated Targeting System;
- Creating a federated view of importers;
- Developing simplified processes and deploying ACE enhancements; and
- Establishing a staff model for the modern trade environment.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: The Intelligent Trade Enforcement initiative has been prioritized by agency leadership and focuses on the central core of *Trade Strategy 2020*. This initiative puts advanced data analytics tools into the hands of users to provide them with new decision-making tools and information. CBP anticipates exploring the pursuit of a new “federated view” capability that consolidates importer data and enforcement workflows, to ensure that CBP operators and analysts have an integrated awareness of activities for an importer at all levels.

(b) (7)(E)

The initiative also will support additional ACE enhancements, including planned simplification of billing and statements, the creation of monthly import declarations and summaries, and consolidated liquidation processes in support of antidumping and countervailing duties administration. These will result in increased efficiencies for trade and CBP, better risk management, and the anticipated reduction of burdensome processing and storage requirements that support long-term liquidation and billing.

2018 BSIP Initiative #3: Personnel Recovery

OVERVIEW: Presidential Policy Directive-30 directs that “each agency with overseas responsibilities shall inform its employees of U.S. policy regarding hostage takings, and provide personnel recovery preparation, education, and training programs to help their employees understand the risk environment, evade capture, survive captivity, minimize their vulnerability to exploitation, and enable their recovery from a threat environment.” On October 4, 2016, the CBP Commissioner’s Priorities and Key Deliverables for FY 2017 memorandum included the following:

- CBP will develop a force protection pre-deployment training plan to prepare all deploying CBP employees for the risks of international travel and assignments.
- CBP will develop a Personnel Recovery Program that addresses policies, training, and infrastructure – consistent with Presidential Policy Directive-30, to prepare CBP employees for travel to high-threat countries and enable their recovery from a threat environment.

AFFECTED CAPABILITIES:

- International engagement
- Information sharing
- Joint operational planning with DOS and other federal partners
- Risk assessments
- Analysis

RELATED OUTCOMES:

BSIP Goal 3: Lead a resilient network of border enforcement capabilities

Objective 1: Expand information- and intelligence-sharing partnerships

Objective 2: Increase ability to address border security risks as early as possible

Objective 3: Strengthen coordinated border enforcement globally

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN:

- Establish CBP personnel recovery policy
- Finalize personnel recovery training requirements that also meet State Department Foreign Affairs Counter Threat and High Threat Security Overseas Seminar training requirements

2018 BSIP Initiative #4: Cloud Migration

OVERVIEW: The CBP Office of Information and Technology (OIT) actively is pursuing cloud migration to reduce technical debt and transform the way that the agency delivers IT solutions to its mission customers. Moving to the cloud is more than an opportunity to move the existing portfolio from an onsite data center to the cloud, it is a long-term effort to streamline, rationalize, and standardize our services. Thus far, the migration effort has taken time, effort, and energy, above and beyond OIT's day-to-day responsibilities. OIT has achieved important milestones in the Data Center Migration effort across several critical areas: security, applications, infrastructure & design standards, and network.

AFFECTED CAPABILITIES:

- Targeting: Targeting and Analysis Systems Program Directorate has supported CBP in expanding the Biometric Exit Program across additional airports both international and domestic, while also communicating with additional airlines for biometric screening adoption.
- Mobility: Enforcement applications will become available in the cloud to include:
[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) Furthermore, the Mobility Center of Excellence & Expertise has been working with customers across CBP to prototype and deploy cloud native mobile applications that address emerging needs. These applications are built using CBP's common application framework, with reusable architecture and consistent branding.
- Passenger Processing: Passenger Systems Program Directorate is expanding development work across a section of targeted applications within TECS and e-Business systems to support eventual migration to Cloud East.

RELATED OUTCOMES:

BSIP Goal 1, Objective 1: Increase situational awareness

BSIP Goal 2, Objective 1: Expand operational readiness

BSIP Goal 2, Objective 2: Enhance impedance and denial of illegal border crossings

BSIP Goal 2, Objective 3: Ensure agility for appropriate and timely law enforcement responses

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: The OIT Migration Plan comprises four major phases that the IT Migration Project will execute in an iterative process to leverage new methods and technologies and incorporate lessons learned throughout the life of the engagement. CBP has developed a plan that will drive migration and optimization efforts, continue cloud-computing initiatives, and promote enterprise solutions to help OIT operate an efficient migration to the cloud. This approach will help OIT to understand their portfolio better and assess and prioritize migration efforts.

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- Discovery Phase: Create an inventory of systems and applications, including current-state architecture, design goals, and future-state hosting requirements.
- Cloud Suitability Assessment & Rationalization: Perform disposition analyses to address business process alignment and high-level cloud suitability. Applications are analyzed and assigned a transformation readiness “score” as an output, and revisions occur in an iterative fashion to gain efficiencies.
- Migration Course of Action Decision: Select a subset of systems for further future-state detailed assessment. Conduct technical engineering assessments to explore further the future-state architecture, sizing requirements, and application linkages and dependencies.
- Project Implementation: Generate a final system prioritization list for a transformation roadmap. Target platforms and identify and prioritize adoption waves to allow CBP to test its cloud strategy. Incorporate lessons learned to improve future projects and yield more accurate costing evaluations.

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V. Ensuring Accountability in Border Security

A. Measuring OPCON and Security at the Immediate Border

In compliance with Executive Order 13767, CBP is reinstating achieving OPCON between the POEs across the entirety of the Southern Border as its overarching goal to ensure that:

- Illegal entries across the U.S. border with Mexico are impeded and denied by sufficient walls, fencing, and other physical and natural barriers;
- USBP agents have a high level of situational awareness that includes near-term predictions of potential illegal entry attempts, as well as an ever-increasing capability to detect illegal entries as they occur; and
- USBP agents can respond efficiently to and interdict illegal entries of people or contraband by training, equipping, and enhancing availability of all agents.

CBP will measure OPCON directly via three elements: impedance and denial (including wall and other barriers, as well as measures of recidivism); situational awareness (including technologies that allow USBP to detect, identify, and track illegal entries, and intelligence capabilities); and law enforcement resolution (including the ability to respond to detections and make a final apprehension). Each of these elements will be evaluated and calculated via a host of subordinate measures currently in development. To aid in the transition to OPCON, DHS recently endorsed an Agency Priority Goal that will begin in FY 2018 and end in FY 2020, to allow for the establishment of a border security end state between POEs along the Southern Border by implementing the OPCON framework to articulate success and direct resources.

Concurrently, technological advances at the border over the past several years have increased situational awareness significantly. Among the three elements of OPCON, situational awareness is a major cornerstone. It combines domain awareness with intelligence data and other information to give USBP the best possible knowledge of how much illicit activity is occurring at the border and what that activity is. In turn, increased situational awareness has allowed USBP to begin pursuing modeling efforts based on the Department's more complete information about illegal entry attempts.

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(b) (7)(E)

Increasing situational awareness narrows the gap between the known and unknown flow, and puts DHS in a position to build ever better observational estimates of border security.

In the interim, USBP will continue to explain its performance using its risk methodology via State of the Border reporting, in addition to reporting numerous measure results under the structure set out in the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act (GPRAMA) structure. USBP's most notable GPRAMA measures are the interdiction

effectiveness rate and the percent of people apprehended multiple times along the Southern Border (recidivism rate). Both of these measures are reported publicly in addition to contributing to USBP “State of the Border Metrics.” In addition, in September 2017, DHS produced an estimate of border security between POEs report⁹ that provides details on an array of indicators that, when combined, provide insight into the state of border security between the POEs on the SWB. More specifically, this report provides indicators within two overarching categories: estimated enforcement outputs and estimated enforcement outcomes.

B. Border Security in the Air and Maritime Environment

CBP’s measures under the GPRAMA in the air and maritime environments complement those reported by USBP and OFO to provide a more complete picture of border security. The two primary measures described below parallel the concepts discussed above because they contribute to CBP’s awareness of activities in the border environment while also assessing the ability to act upon that knowledge. The two GPRAMA measures that CBP’s AMO uses include:

- *Percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all borders of the United States:* This measure represents the percentage of conventional aircraft detected visually or by sensor technology, which is suspected of illegal cross-border activity and is brought to a successful law enforcement resolution.
- *Air Mission Launch Rate:* This represents AMO’s capability and/or capacity to launch an aircraft when a request is made for aerial response. This measure captures the percent of all requests made for aircraft to which AMO was able to respond.

C. Border Security Measures at the POEs

OFO manages the lawful access of people and goods to the United States by securing and expediting international trade and travel at the POEs. CBP enforces the customs, immigration, and agricultural laws of the United States, together with the laws and regulations of other government entities at the border, such as ICE, DOS, U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and HHS, among others.

Every traveler and cargo shipment seeking entry to the United States by air, land, or sea through one of the 328 POEs must present themselves to CBP Officers, who determine admissibility and identify violations of the law and potential threats to public safety. OFO works to identify risks and potential threats at the earliest possible moment in the trade and travel process by using the most current law enforcement and targeting information assembled by (b) (7)(E) to screen both individual travelers and cargo shipments. The (b) (7)(E)

⁹ https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0914_estimates-of-border-security.pdf

(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E) and to assess the potential security risks of cargo shipments. (b) (7)(E) uses a wide array of law enforcement data sources, as well as information that must be provided by shippers in advance of arrival at the POE, to assess the security risks of cargo shipments before they arrive. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E) In addition, DHS uses automated systems and enforcement operations to ensure that persons, shipments, and conveyances departing the United States are in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations. The goal of the outbound enforcement effort is to disrupt/dismantle criminal enterprises, terrorist organizations, and rogue nations by seizing illegal firearm shipments and smuggled currency, interdicting illegal exports of controlled/sensitive commodities, and arresting members or associates of these organizations.

Travel and trade continue to grow steadily, together with expanding mission requirements, challenging CBP efforts to secure the border at the POEs. During FY 2017, OFO inspected more than 397 million travelers, conducted more than 34.2 million traveler secondary exams, screened more than 104 million privately owned vehicles, conducted more than 4 million privately owned vehicle secondary exams, conducted more than 19.6 million passenger agricultural inspections, and prevented more than 216,000 inadmissible aliens from entering the United States illegally. On the cargo side, OFO inspected 11.8 million truck containers and conducted physical examinations on more than another 2.7 million, inspected more than 28 million sea containers and physically examined an additional 5.2 million, conducted nearly 1.8 million agricultural cargo and conveyance inspections, and made more than 128,000 pest interceptions. Overall, OFO made nearly 40,000 seizures of contraband, including narcotics, currency, and weapons, and more than 19,600 arrests.

In addition to tracking, monitoring, and reporting an extensive array of operational data on passenger and trade inspection and enforcement activity, OFO uses a number of high-level organizational measures to provide a broader assessment of border security at the POEs:

- *Percentage of inbound cargo identified by CBP as potentially high-risk that is assessed or scanned prior to departure or at arrival at a U.S. POE:* This is a comprehensive measure that covers the sea, air, and land modes for all cargo destined to arrive at the POEs. Screening and resolving potentially high-risk cargo prior to or at arrival at the POEs ensures the safety of the U.S. public and minimizes the impact to trade through the effective use of risk-focused targeting.
- *Amount of smuggled outbound currency seized at the POEs:* Covers outbound operations conducted across all POEs.
- *Number of smuggled outbound weapons seized at the POEs:* Covers outbound operations conducted across all POEs. Does not include administrative holds and seizures that were released later for shipment upon corrective action.

- *Compliance rate for CTPAT members with the established CTPAT security guidelines:* Compliance with the CTPAT security guidelines ensures that CTPAT trade partners are implementing the CBP-advised internal security practices and meeting industry-specific security standards.
- *Cost savings benefit for CTPAT members:* Represents the savings that a CTPAT partner achieves through membership in the program. Uses the number of examinations that the partner does not undergo because of membership and the nationally averaged dollar cost by transportation mode (air, rail, truck, and vessel) of an examination. New measure for FY 2018.
- *Percentage of Global Entry and other Trusted Traveler program members with no security-related revocations:* Trusted Traveler members are vetted recurrently against derogatory information to maintain eligibility for the program. New measure for FY 2017.
- *Percentage of air passengers compliant with laws, rules, and regulations:* Measures compliance with all the laws, rules, and regulations enforced at the international airports on behalf of CBP and all other agencies that CBP supports, as tasked by Congress, with the exception of agricultural laws and regulations.
- *Percentage of land border passengers compliant with laws, rules, and regulations:* Measures compliance with all the laws, rules, and regulations enforced at the land border POEs on behalf of CBP and all other agencies that CBP supports, as tasked by Congress, with the exception of agricultural laws and regulations.
- *Percentage of international air passengers compliant with Agricultural Quarantine Regulations:* Measures compliance with all the agricultural quarantine laws and regulations enforced at the international airports on behalf of CBP and U.S. Department of Agriculture, as tasked by Congress.
- *Percentage of border vehicle passengers compliant with Agricultural Quarantine Regulations:* Measures compliance with all the agricultural quarantine laws and regulations enforced at the land border POEs on behalf of CBP and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, as tasked by Congress.
- *Percentage of individuals screened against law enforcement databases for entry into United States:* Measures the success rate of electronically screening and vetting all travelers against the major law enforcement databases used by CBP to ensure that CBP has as much information as possible about every individual.

VI. Conclusion

A. Future Planning

The 2018 BSIP provides CBP with a framework to analyze and prioritize planning to improve border security. It begins by establishing a common understanding of the meaning of border security as a function of:

- Knowing what is happening in the border environment,
- Having the ability to act or respond to that knowledge, and
- Cultivating partnerships that enhance knowledge and ability to act.

Strengthening border security is an ongoing and iterative process. The initiatives detailed in this document provide actions and milestones supporting the goals and objectives in this plan, and they represent current known requirements. As CBP continuously strengthens border security, these initiatives will be evaluated for their ongoing contributions to improving border security.

1. Mitigating Outside Influences

A comprehensive approach to border security must recognize that there are many factors beyond DHS's control that affect border security. Those factors can increase or decrease the demands on DHS, which, in turn, may affect DHS's operational footprint and requirements.

For example, many sociological factors naturally affect border security. This includes factors that "pull" people to enter the United States and "push" them from their homelands. The state of the economy, political climate, corruption, crime rates, and disease outbreaks all can work as "push" factors to encourage people to leave their home country. Conversely, the state of the U.S. economy, the U.S. legal system, the effectiveness of internal enforcement, the availability of social services, and the U.S. political climate all can work as "pull" factors encouraging people to attempt to cross our borders illegally. The number of people influenced by these push and pull factors has an impact on DHS. More people seeking to enter the country (at or between the ports) requires an increase in CBP personnel and resources to achieve a constant level of border security. Thus, any assessment that CBP conducts of the resources that it needs to ensure border security will always depend on assumptions about these outside influences.

U.S. legal and governmental elements and considerations also will affect border security. For example, national policies on immigration affect border security. Similarly, a legal framework facilitates effective border security if it empowers law enforcement personnel with appropriate authority to detect, and apprehend those who attempt to enter the United States illegally. This legal framework also should support frontline law enforcement personnel by instituting efficient processes for removing individuals who enter the United States contrary to law. Conversely, a

legal system that does not meet these benchmarks, is an impediment to border security. The governmental considerations that affect border security are complicated further by the fact that there are many federal agencies that have a role in the flow of goods or people into and out of the United States. The efficiency with which these agencies work together and the effectiveness of interagency collaboration naturally will affect DHS's role in securing the border.

2. Immigration Reform

While a comprehensive approach to border security necessarily must include active support to all of DHS's layered enforcement efforts, it also must include many other elements. For example, an effective immigration system often begins with effective legal processes. If individuals do not face adequate consequences for illegally entering the United States, such as removal or prosecution, then those individuals and others are incentivized to try to cross the border illegally.

An effective system of immigration should include statutory provisions that enable DHS and its partner enforcement agencies to apprehend, process, review, and return quickly those individuals who attempt illicit crossings at our borders who are not otherwise eligible for an immigration benefit. Additionally, an effective system would enable those who are entitled to enter the United States legally with a safe, understandable, timely and efficient legal process.

The development of such a system requires the participation of Congress and the other federal agencies involved in immigration enforcement including, but not limited to, USCIS, ICE, the Department of Justice, and DOS. For example, Congress may develop a more effective immigration system through statutory changes. Although any legislative changes to immigration or other legal authorities may not always affect CBP directly, the development of a more efficient immigration system will enhance CBP's ability to perform its mission in securing the border and enforcing U.S. laws. CBP also is committed to working with Congress and law enforcement partners to share its institutional knowledge of the border to suggest opportunities to improve and enhance the effectiveness of the legal framework within which it operates.

3. Consultation

DHS recognizes the importance of consultation and frequently consults with federal stakeholders such as the Department of the Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency concerning environmental impacts related to the construction of border barriers, to include impacts to the Santa Ana National Wildlife Refuge. In the spring of 2017, CBP initiated coordination with the U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to inform them of the planning, design, and construction phases of the border wall system, and to consult U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service on resources that may be present in project areas, as well as potential impacts and mitigation measures in order to minimize or eliminate impacts to the environment.

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Since these initial discussions, CBP has conducted additional meetings with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Interior, and other federal and state agencies on CBP's FY 2018 wall projects to incorporate their concerns and considerations. CBP also soon will be conducting biological and cultural surveys in the project area within the Rio Grande Valley Sector for its FY 2018 projects. An analysis of the potential impacts from these projects will be prepared once all of the data are collected and further consultation with resource agencies is completed.

CBP's ongoing consultation includes but is not limited to federal land managers, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Native American tribes, and State Historic Preservation Officers to obtain information related to the presence of natural and cultural resources within the project area, as well as to identify construction best management practices and any appropriate mitigation measures.

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VII. Appendices

Appendix A. List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
ACE	Automated Commercial Environment
ADE	Acquisition Decision Event
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
ASO	Alien Smuggling Organization
BIEC	Border Interagency Executive Council
BPERT	Border Patrol Enterprise Reporting Tool
BPES	Border Patrol Enforcement System
BSIP	Border Security Improvement Plan
CAVSS	Centralized Area Video Surveillance System
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBTT	Cross-Border Tunnel Threat
CCS	Cargo Conveyance and Security
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CDS	Consequence Delivery System
CDS-PMO	CDS Project Management Office
CERTS	Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System
CM	Configuration Management
CRD	Capabilities and Requirements Division
CSM	Container Status Message
CTPAT	Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
D/EAC	Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOS	U.S. Department of State
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
ECCF	Express Consignment Carrier Facility
EIAB	Economic Analysis Branch, Regulations and Rulings
ES	Enterprise Services
ESD	Enforcement Systems Division
FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act
FM&E	Facilities Management and Engineering Office
FROB	Foreign Cargo Remaining On Board
FSLT	Federal, State, Local, and Tribal
FTZ	Foreign Trade Zone

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Acronym	Definition
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
GPRAMA	Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act
HHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HRBE	Human Resources Business Engine
HRM	Office of Human Resources Management
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IE	Immediate Exportation
IFT	Integrated Fixed Tower
IMF	International Mail Facility
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
ISF	Importer Security Filing
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
JICMS	Joint Integrity Case Management System
JRC	Joint Requirements Council
LER	Labor and Employee Relations
LESC	Law Enforcement Officer Safety and Compliance Directorate
LSS	Laboratories and Scientific Services
NII	Non-Intrusive Inspection
NTC	National Targeting Center
NVC	National Vetting Center
NVOCC	Nonvessel Operating Common Carriers
NYFO	New York Field Office
O&S	Operations and Support
OCC	Office of Chief Counsel
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OI	Office of Intelligence
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIT	Office of Information Technology
OPCON	Operational Control
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OPS	Operations Directorate
OS	Operations Support
OT	Office of Trade
OTD	Office of Training and Development
PARE	Planning Analysis Requirements & Evaluation Directorate
PBG	Patrol Border Group
PC&I	Procurement, Construction, and Improvements

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Acronym	Definition
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones
POC	Point of Contact
POE	Port of Entry
PSPPH	Physical Security Policy and Procedures Handbook
RFD	Request for Development
RVSS	Remote Video Surveillance Systems
SAMEPH	Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedure Handbook
SIP	Self-Inspection Program
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SWB	Southwest Border
SWS	Single Window Sustainment
T&E	Transportation and Exportation
TCO	Transnational Criminal Organization
TVPRA	Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
UAC	Unaccompanied Alien Children
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UGS	Unattended Ground Sensors
USBP	U.S. Border Patrol
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USPS	U.S. Postal Service
VADER	Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar
WMDD	Weapons of Mass Destruction Division

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Appendix B. List of Open U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) Recommendations Regarding Border Security

OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS (AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2018)
USBP	GAO-09-824	Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data.	CBP provided GAO with its Traffic Checkpoint Policy, draft Checkpoint Operation Manual, Chief’s memorandum on limiting operational vulnerability, Chief’s memorandum on checkpoint data integrity, and Chief’s memorandum on the UTEP & BORDERS checkpoint study. In addition, CBP has established a checkpoint program management office. CBP accomplished all the milestones by November 2016, and CBP continues to work with GAO to close the recommendation. On June 13, 2018, the revised checkpoint policy was submitted for final review and approval.
USBP	GAO-09-824	Implement the quality of life measures that have been identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local communities. Implementing these measures would include identifying appropriate data sources available at the local, state, or federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be collected and used in support of these measures.	The requirements have been drafted and sent to U.S. Border Patrol’s (USBP) Enforcement Systems Division (ESD) to update metrics on the Border Patrol Enterprise Reporting Tool (BPERT) page for visibility to the field. The report is built but pending internal vetting/ approval prior to being pushed out to E3.
USBP	GAO-09-824	In connection with planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, conduct a workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing allocations to determine the resources needed to address anticipated levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.	CBP continues to address this recommendation. The beta version of the Patrol Border Staffing Model was completed and fielded at the Chief Patrol Agent’s conference in July 2018. This model examines the relationship of workload and conditions per Patrol Border Group (PBG) agent; provides beta version information regarding effects of workload (e.g., flow, apprehensions, seizures, other agency calls, sensor hits) and conditions (e.g.,

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OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS (AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2018)
			<p>miles of border without barrier, total area of responsibility, surveillance score) on staffing levels; examines minimal to current staffing requirements; and provides relationships of workload and conditions to the Essential Mission Function staffing level. CBP developed work studies to lay the groundwork for developing staffing model/tools. These studies provide the factors, data, and analyses that determine how the staffing model and tools will be constructed. PBG and Sector Intelligence Unit work studies have been completed at all sectors. Special operations work studies with the Special Operations Group, and all sectors with Special Operations Division have been completed. Resulted in enhanced online surveys for data collection on all sectors and stations. The remaining work studies will be conducted for the following: Operational Programs and Mission Readiness Operations personnel. The initial work study version for Operational Programs and Mission Readiness Operations personnel were reviewed at the onsite visits in the Miami (August) and Rio Grande Valley Sectors (September). The online version is underway. CBP continues to collect data to develop and implement models for additional essential mission functions.</p>
USBP	GAO-09-824	Use the information generated from the quality of life measures to inform resource allocations and address identified impacts.	<p>The requirements have been drafted for USBP's ESD to capture criminal aliens apprehended at checkpoints. The number of drugs/narcotics apprehended at checkpoints has been integrated within BPERT for each sector. The Checkpoint Management Office will monitor the data and an informational page will be auto-</p>

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OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS (AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2018)
USBP	GAO-14-165SU and GAO-14-368 (rec6)	Once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to its border security efforts.	generated for sectors to have visibility. The report is built but is pending internal vetting/approval prior to being pushed out to E3. CBP provided GAO with documentation from a study conducted in Nogales, Arizona, that evaluated the impact of deployed technology in relation to performance metrics and has requested closure of the recommendation. CBP sent a final response to GAO on June 5, 2018. USBP still is coordinating in its ESD on the report function. USBP has developed multiple ways to track technical assists in the Enforce (e3) system and the Tracking and Sign Cutting Modeling system. Additionally, USBP has developed a tool to quantify better contributions of surveillance technologies to its border security efforts. This document serves as the current process in which USBP determines how technology is deployed/tracked with the timeline for the remaining implementation.
USBP	GAO-15-521 (rec 4)	To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA [Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008] requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS [the Department of Health and Human Services], we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection [CBP] to develop and implement guidance on how Border Patrol agents and OFO [Office of Field Operations] officers are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. CBP Office of Policy updated the Form 93. With the revised Form 93 now issued, CBP's OFO and USBP, in consultation with CBP's Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) and Office Training and Development (OTD), will collaborate to develop, deconflict, and revise training consistent with requirements under TVPRA, specifically outlining rules to identify and screen unaccompanied alien children (UAC). This training will emphasize the importance of: (1) properly identifying a juvenile as a UAC, (2) processing for appropriate removal proceedings for a UAC, and (3) if the UAC is from a contiguous country,

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			when that UAC may be permitted to withdraw his or her application for admission or voluntarily return. TVPRA training will address the notification timeline further, transfer the process to HHS, and properly record previously stated factors and the overall care given to the UAC.
OFO	GAO-15-521 (rec 1)	To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to develop and implement TVPRA training for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC.	CBP OFO no longer is pursuing a separate train-the-trainer course for CBP officers at air ports of entry (POE). The new course in development is a collaborative effort between OFO and USBP, in consultation with OCC, and in partnership with OTD, to develop, deconflict, and revise training consistent with requirements under the TVPRA, specifically outlining rules to identify and screen UAC. This training will emphasize the importance of: (1) properly identifying a juvenile as a UAC, (2) processing for appropriate removal proceedings for a UAC, and (3) if the UAC is from a contiguous country, when that UAC may be permitted to withdraw his or her application for admission or voluntarily return. TVPRA training will address the notification timeline further, transfer the process to HHS, and properly record previously stated factors and the overall care given to the UAC.
USBP	GAO-15-521 (rec 5)	To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to ensure that Border Patrol agents document the basis for their decisions when assessing screening criteria related to (1) an unaccompanied alien child's ability to make an independent	CBP continues to address the recommendation. CBP Office of Policy collaborated with USBP, as well as the CBP OCC and OFO to update the Form 93 to capture the required information. This screening tool provides a mechanism for officers and agents to screen UAC consistently and thoroughly. This tool contains sections relating to the UAC's fear of return to their country

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		decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States, and (2) whether UAC are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons.	of nationality or last habitual residence as well as indicators of human trafficking. For UAC who are nationals or habitual residents of a contiguous country, it also addresses the UAC's ability to make an independent decision to withdraw their application for admission. This form's use is consistent with the requirements of TVPRA. With the revised Form 93 now issued, USBP can begin to code its database to capture the updated information from the Form 93.
USBP	GAO-15-521 (rec 3)	To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers that clarifies how they are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing to a credible fear of persecution.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. CBP Office of Policy updated the Form 93, in accordance with recommendation 2. With the revised Form 93 now issued, CBP OFO and USBP, in consultation with CBP OCC and OTD, will collaborate to develop, deconflict, and revise training consistent with requirements under TVPRA, specifically outlining rules to identify and screen UAC. This training will emphasize the importance of: (1) properly identifying a juvenile as a UAC, (2) processing for appropriate removal proceedings for a UAC, and (3) if the UAC is from a contiguous country, when that UAC may be permitted to withdraw his or her application for admission or voluntarily return. TVPRA training will address the notification timeline further, transfer the process to HHS, and properly record previously stated factors and the overall care given to the UAC.
USBP	GAO-17-66	The Chief of Border Patrol should strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism such as by using an alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and excluding aliens for whom there	CDS-PMO has started to include the national multiple year recidivism rate in its quarterly power points that are sent to the sectors. USBP continues to work with GAO to provide further

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		is no record of removal and who may remain in the United States	information to close out the recommendation.
USBP	GAO-17-66	The Chief of Border Patrol should revise CDS guidance to ensure consistent and accurate methodologies for estimating Border Patrol costs across consequences and to factor in, where appropriate and available, the relative costs of any federal partner resources necessary to implement each consequence	The costs associated with federal partners is not included in the CDS-PMO's cost of apprehension factor, as it does not impact USBP resources. CDS is a USBP specific program designed to analyze costs incurred by USBP from the time of processing to the time the alien is no longer in USBP's custody. During the annual reevaluations, USBP sector personnel stated that they do not include consequence costs applied by other agencies. CBP has submitted documentation for closure of this recommendation.
OFO	GAO-16-646SU/ GAO-17-216	To better ensure the effectiveness of CBP's predeparture programs, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP's predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals.	CBP OFO has undertaken a number of steps to act upon the recommendations in the referenced January 2017 GAO Report. OFO assembled a working group, comprising senior program managers from each of its predeparture and prescreening programs to perform a review of program activities, surveyed all available predeparture/prescreening program-related operational data, and select the data elements that would provide reliable information regarding program execution and performance over time. In October 2017, the working group used these data to formulate three high-level, cross-program performance measures that consolidate this information and incorporate the interdependencies inherent in these programs. In February 2018, OFO began assembling the data elements required to support the fiscal year (FY) 2018 baseline year calculation of the three high-level, cross-program performance measures. OFO has

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			initiated the computation process for the three new tracking and reporting measures for activity during FY 2018 covering the period October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018. OFO estimates this process will be complete by December 31, 2018. Collected data and results will be reviewed with subject matter experts (SME) to identify any outstanding issues relating to accuracy or data reliability.
AMO	GAO-17-152 (rec 1)	Develop and document procedures for Predator B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. To date, CBP has established a path forward to enhance tasking coordination.
AMO	GAO-17-152 (rec 3)	Provide training to users of CBP's data collection system for Predator B missions.	CBP continues to address the recommendation and, to date, has completed the following milestones: developing a schedule for Air and Marine Operations (AMO) Headquarters personnel to conduct training at each Predator B location.
AMO	GAO-17-152 (rec 2)	Update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its data collection system.	CBP continues to address the recommendation and, to date, has completed the following milestones: began updating its system of record to record Predator B mission data; and developed a phased approach to disseminate guidance as new functionality is incorporated into the system.
USBP	GAO-17-167SU / GAO-17-331	Develop and implement written guidance to include roles and responsibilities for the steps within its requirements process for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure assets for border security operations.	CBP developed the USBP risk management process with six stages that help establish requirements: strategic guidance, mission analysis, planning, execution, assessment, and lifecycle management; conducted a baseline analysis that provided greater ability to consider all solutions for comprehensive border security analysis. USBP Operational Requirements Management Division and Planning and Measures Division coordinated work on establishing

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			measures that gauge our impedance and denial as part of Operational Control (OPCON). The measures taxonomy that was created looks at USBP's ability to impede or deny illegal border crossings. In June USBP established the initial measures framework for impedance and denial within the taxonomy and traveled to San Diego Sector to brief local leadership and two stations, Imperial Beach and Brownfield, for feedback on the measures. Both stations believed that the impedance and denial measures were applicable and an appropriate way to measure impedance and denial capability. The internal operating procedures have been completed and issued. CBP has submitted documentation for closure of this recommendation.
USBP	GAO-17-167SU / GAO-17-331	Develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. USBP is implementing the OPCON framework across all Southwest Border (SWB) sectors, allowing USBP to develop baseline values for OPCON for all SWB line stations. The framework is composed of three elements: impedance and denial; situational awareness; and response and resolution. To date, CBP has established an initial taxonomy for impedance and denial, established an initial taxonomy methodology, conducted a pilot, analyzed pilot results, and briefed USBP leadership on the results. CBP will begin to conduct OPCON framework implementation in additional sectors.

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AMO	GAO-17-205SU & GAO-17-474 (rec 3)	That the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. To date, CBP has developed the necessary DHS requirements documentation and conducted a geospatial radar coverage analysis.
AMO	GAO-17-205SU & GAO-17-474 (rec 5)	That the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft.	CBP continues to address the recommendation and, to date, has completed the following milestones: implemented an internal collaborative effort to develop a joint AMO and USBP performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft.
USBP	GAO-17-205SU & GAO-17-474 (rec 2)	That the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP-U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] tunnel committee to convene and establish standard operating procedures [SOP] for addressing cross-border tunnels, including procedures for sharing information.	<p>CBP continues to address the recommendation. To date, CBP has continued to implement existing procedures that support this recommendation; continued enhancing relationship with ICE; and began review of SOPs to identify areas of improvement.</p> <p>USBP is looking actively for standardization opportunities for the tunnel threat environment. This will create opportunities to focus on the processes of detection, interdiction, mapping, and remediation of cross-border tunnels. The first standardization on which USBP is focusing is training. USBP Headquarters is detailing an SME from the Tunnel Patrol Group at Nogales Station to the USBP HQ Training Group. This agent will be compiling the first-ever Tunnel Identification Class. USBP is working with the USBP Basic Academy to have this class included (upon completion) in the Post Academy Training for all Border Patrol agents. This will ensure that all new agents get consistent training</p>

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			<p>on indications of tunneling activity and actions to take when the activity is observed. USBP is working with the CBP Advanced Training Center to ensure that this class will be available to all current Border Patrol agents.</p> <p>(b) (7)(E)</p>

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			<p>(b) (7)(E)</p> <p>(b) (7)(E) Recently, a second Assistant Chief position was added to the USBP Headquarters Tunnel Group. This will create the opportunity for more coordination with ICE at the Headquarters level regarding cross-border tunnel interdictions and investigations.</p>
OFO	GAO-17-419SU (rec 1)	Enforce the 10+2 rule requirement that carriers provide container status messages (CSM) to CBP when targeters identify CSM noncompliance.	On April 12, 2018, CBP published a final rule titled, "Definition of Importer Security Filing Importer," in the Federal Register (83 FR 15736). The final rule broadened the definition of Importer Security Filing (ISF) Importer for foreign cargo remaining on board (FROB) shipments to include nonvessel operating common carriers (NVOCC), immediate exportation (IE), transportation and exportation (T&E) in-bond cargo, and foreign trade zone (FTZ) cargo (ISF-5 filings). The broader definition of ISF Importer generally removes the ambiguity that existed in the previous regulatory language with regard to who is responsible for certain ISF-5 filings. This clarification allows CBP to enforce the requirements of the ISF rule comprehensively. The ISF rule requires importers and vessel-operating carriers to provide additional advance trade data on cargo shipments to CBP generally prior to vessel lading, pursuant to Section 203 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 and Section 343(a) of the Trade Act of 2002.

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			<p>OFO/Cargo and Conveyance Security (CCS)/Manifest and Conveyance Security Division has worked with Enterprise Services (ES)/Office of Information and Technology (OIT) to explore the development of CSM to the trade community/carriers and the corresponding technical requirements. To create the CSM messages would involve complex programming and funding to do so. In addition, the CSMs would cause confusion and could result in more than a billion messages. The ports have the authority to enforce CSM, and the current plan is for OFO/CCS to remind the ports to do so and to provide guidance. OFO/CCS has drafted an updated CSM enforcement memo to reiterate guidance to field personnel. The memo was issued to the field in June 2018. As with the ISF-10 enforcement, CBP will take a common-sense and phased approach to enforcement. (b) (7)(E)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(b) (7)(E)</p> <p>(b) (7)(E) ports also will be reminded that liquidated damages claims and other enforcement actions against carriers for Vessel Stow Plan and Container Status Message violations are authorized.</p>
OFO	GAO-17-419SU (rec 2)	Evaluate the Importer Security Filing (ISF) enforcement strategies used by Advance Targeting Units (ATU) to assess whether particular enforcement methods could be applied to ports with relatively low submission rates.	In conjunction with the OFO, (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) ISF enforcement strategies are discussed in the monthly ATU calls with the POEs so that best practices may be shared and

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OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS (AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2018)
			<p>developed further. On April 12, 2018, CBP published a final rule titled, "Definition of Importer Security Filing Importer," in the Federal Register (83 FR 15736). The final rule broadened the definition of ISF Importer for FROB shipments to include NVOCCs, and IE, T&E in-bond cargo, and FTZ cargo (ISF-5 filings). The broader definition of ISF Importer generally removes the ambiguity that existed in the previous regulatory language with regard to who is responsible for certain ISF-5 filings. This clarification allows CBP to enforce the requirements of the ISF rule comprehensively. The ISF rule requires importers and vessel-operating carriers to provide additional advance trade data on cargo shipments to CBP generally prior to vessel lading, pursuant to Section 203 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 and Section 343(a) of the Trade Act of 2002.</p> <p>OFO CCS has drafted an updated CSM enforcement memo to reiterate guidance to field personnel. The memo was issued to the field in June 2018. Ports were reminded that liquidated damages claims and other enforcement actions against carriers for Vessel Stow Plan and Container Status Message violations are authorized. Moving forward, liquidated damages claims for ISF violations will be initiated no later than 90 days from the date of discovery of the violation, except in instances furthering the development of criminal cases. Enforcement of the ISF-5 requirements through liquidated damages claims will begin no sooner</p>

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